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PREVENTING PREDATORY LENDING
IN THE CALIFORNIA SUBPRIME
MORTGAGE MARKET
Ronald Law*
Examining the origins of the California subprime mortgage crisis, this
Note attempts to explain why California legislation failed to deter
predatory lending practices in the subprime mortgage market.
Specifically, California Financial Code Division 1.6, which was
enacted in 2001 to prevent the proliferation of unjust mortgage loans,
contains several fundamental flaws. Although California chaptered
Senate Bill 385 into law in 2007 to increase oversight of the subprime
mortgage market, this legislation is insufficient to curb predatory
lending practices. To address the hazards of inadequate underwriting
standards, yield spread premiums, standardized disclosure, and
reduced-documentation loans, this Note proposes a six-part legislative
solution to the predatory lending problem.
1. INTRODUCTION
Predatory lending has contributed significantly to the collapse of
the subprime mortgage market in California.' In 2001, California
enacted Financial Code Division 1.6 to deter predatory practices in
subprime lending.2 Unfortunately, this legislation has proven to be
insufficient to prevent the proliferation of unjust loans? Recognizing
the need for greater regulation, the California Senate in February
2007 introduced Bill 385 to further address the predatory lending
issue.' This bill was chaptered into law in October 2007. 5 The
provisions of Bill 385, however, are vague and incomplete.
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1. See infra Part II.
2. Am. Fin. Servs. Ass'n v. City of Oaldand, 104 P.3d 813, 815 (Cal. 2005).
3. See infra Part V.
4. S.B. 385, S. 2007-2008, Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2007).
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This Note presents a potential solution to the problem of
predatory lending in California. Part II of this Note illustrates the
origins of the subprime mortgage crisis in California. Part III
explains why Division 1.6 failed to create protections that could have
prevented the crisis. Part IV explains why Senate Bill 385 will also
fail to cure the predatory lending problem. Part V proposes a six-
part legislative solution, designed to thwart the most prevalent
predatory lending practices by addressing the flaws of Division 1.6
and Senate Bill 385.
II. OVERVIEW OF THE CALIFORNIA SUBPRIME
MORTGAGE CRISIS
A. What is a Subprime Mortgage?
Subprime lending refers to the extension of credit to persons
who are considered to be high-risk borrowers.6 For example,
subprime borrowers tend to possess one or more of the following risk
characteristics: recent payment delinquency or bankruptcy, a low
credit score, or a high debt-to-income ratio.7 Conversely, a "prime"
borrower usually does not possess any of these risk characteristics
A subprime mortgage is simply a mortgage loan made to a subprime
borrower.9  Lenders are willing to take on the additional risk
accompanying a subprime borrower because they offset their risk by
charging higher interest."
B. Why Did the Subprime Mortgage Market Collapse?
Due to various economic factors, including low interest rates,
rapid home price appreciation, and strong investor demand for
5. Id.
6. See Ronald G. Isaac, Prepared Statement of the Federal Trade Commission Before the
California State Assembly Committee on Banking and Finance on Predatory Lending Practices in
the Home-Equity Lending Market (Feb. 21, 2001), available at http://www.ftc.gov/be/
v010002.shtm.
7. Press Release, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency et al., Expanded Guidance for
Subprime Lending Programs (Jan. 31, 2001), available at http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/
2001/pr0901 a.html.
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. See Yulia Demyanyk & Otto Van Hemert, Understanding the Subprime Mortgage
Crisis, Soc. Sci. RESEARCH NET. 4 (Dec. 5, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.c fm?abstractid=1020396.
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mortgage-based securities, the subprime mortgage market grew
dramatically over the last several years." Between 2003 and 2005,
the subprime share of all original mortgage loans increased from 7.9
percent to approximately 20 percent.'2  Unfortunately, during the
same period, the foreclosure rate on subprime loans doubled from 9.8
percent to 19.4 percent. 3 These figures suggest that while the total
number of subprime loans was growing, many of these loans were
issued to borrowers who could not afford to repay their debt.
The expansion of the subprime market over the last half-decade
was primarily driven by the growth of intermediaries between the
borrower and the lender.' 4  These intermediaries, including loan
originators such as mortgage brokers and mortgage companies, had a
strong incentive to increase the supply of subprime loans."'
Unfortunately, the intermediaries also had little incentive to ensure
that the loans were affordable. In 2006, approximately two-thirds of
all subprime loans were originated by mortgage brokers. 6 A
mortgage broker is a mortgage salesperson who markets to
prospective borrowers, assesses borrower credit, and submits loan
applications to lenders on the borrower's behalf.7 Mortgage brokers
are chiefly concerned with moving a given transaction to closing,
upon which the broker receives a commission from the lender. 8
Brokers have little interest in originating loans that are fair or
11. See Subprime and Predatory Lending: New Regulatory Guidance, Current Market
Conditions, and Effects on Regulated Institutions: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Financial
Institutions and Consumer Credit of the H. Comm. on Financial Serv., 110th Cong. 69-70 (2007)
(statement of Sheila C. Bair, Chairman, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation).
12. Inside Mortgage Finance, http://www.imfpubs.com (last visited Oct. 18, 2008).
13. See ELLEN SCHLOEMER ET AL., LOSING GROUND: FORECLOSURES IN THE SUBPRIME
MARKET AND THEIR COST TO HOMEOWNERS 16 (2006), available at http://
www.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/foreclosure-paper-report-2- 17.pdf.
14. See CHARLES E. SCHUMER & CAROLYN B. MALONEY, THE SUBPRIME LENDING CRISIS:
THE ECONOMIC IMPACT ON WEALTH, PROPERTY VALUES AND TAX REVENUES, AND How WE
GOT HERE 17 (2007), available at http://www.minnpost.com/client-files/pdfs/
102507OctoberSubprimeReport.pdf.
15. Id.
16. SCHLOEMER ET AL., supra note 13, at 24.
17. See id. at 28.
18. See id.
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favorable to the borrower. 9 In fact, the more expensive the loan, the
higher the broker's commission."
Mortgage companies were another major lending channel.
Because mortgage companies are not deposit-taking institutions, they
are not subject to the safety and soundness regulations that govern
federal or state banks.22 Once a mortgage company obtains a
corporate license from the state, any employee of the corporation can
originate a loan, without any training or education prerequisites.23
An employee who originates loans under the company's umbrella
license is typically called a loan officer. The officer has essentially
the same incentive as a mortgage broker: to maximize commissions
by originating as many expensive loans as possible.
While lenders had strong incentives to make predatory or
questionable loans, certain elements limited their incentive to
originate affordable loans. For example, lenders typically held onto
only a fraction of the loans they made in their own portfolios.24
Instead, they aggregated and sold the majority of the loans to
secondary markets as asset-backed securities. Rather than
receiving revenue from individual mortgage payments in due course,
selling packaged loan securities allowed lenders to generate full
returns instantly. In this scheme, the lender's strongest incentive was
to close the loan, sell it immediately for profit, and make more loans
to repeat the cycle.
The securities firms that purchased the loans from the lenders
also cared little about the affordability of each loan. Since each loan
was pooled with thousands of other loans and sold as a security to
investors, most of the risk was distributed to the investment
community.26 Because of the strong home value appreciation during
19. See id. at 29.
20. Brokers receive a bonus from the lender for originating a higher-priced loan. This bonus
is called the Yield Spread Premium (YSP). For more on YSPs, see infra Part III.B.
21. SCHUMER & MALONEY, supra note 14, at 17.
22. Id. at 18.
23. CAL. ASS'N OF MORTGAGE BROKERS, CREATING THE HIGHEST STANDARDS OF
CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE MORTGAGE INDUSTRY: AN ACTION PLAN FOR THE MORTGAGE
INDUSTRY, REGULATORS AND CONSUMERS 4 (2006).
24. SCHUMER & MALONEY, supra note 14, at 18.
25. Id.
26. See Josh Clark, How Can Mortgage-backed Securities Bring Down the U.S. Economy?,
How STUFF WORKS, Sept. 29, 2008, http://www.howstuffworks.com/mortgage-backed-
security.htm.
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this period, borrowers who faced financial difficulties could resolve
their problems temporarily by refinancing their respective
mortgages. 27  Refinancing masked the immediate losses from
defaulting loans, and as a result, investor demand for subprime asset-
based securities remained strong.28 Overall, there was an ample
supply of credit, combined with little motivation for any participant
in the lending channel to ensure the affordability of each individual
loan.
The increase in the supply of subprime credit coincided with an
increase in consumer demand for such credit. From 2001 to 2004,
the Federal Reserve cut interest rates thirteen times in response to the
recession, the dot-coin collapse, and the September 11 terrorist
attacks.29 With reduced rates, housing became far more affordable
for new homebuyers. Meanwhile, housing prices appreciated at
historic rates from 2001 to 2005."o In response, many homeowners
extracted the increased equity in their home to fund their consumer
debts." In 2003, approximately twelve million mortgage loans were
refinanced into new mortgages.32
As competition increased in the subprime market, lenders
looked for new ways to increase the volume of subprime mortgages.
When underwriting standards continued to decline, predatory lending
practices became more prevalent. Lenders focused on promoting
adjustable rate mortgages ("ARM"), where borrowers were qualified
for loans under a low initial "teaser" rate, even though the interest
rate thereafter adjusted periodically based on a market index.33
27. See Allan K. Krinsman, Subprime Mortgage Meltdown: How Did It Happen and How
Will It End?, 13 J. STRUCTURED FIN. 1 (2007).
28. Id. at 2.
29. Bankrate.com, 2001-2004 Key Interest Rate Moves, http://www.bankrate.comIbrm/
news/fed/20010627e.asp?prodtype=mtg&thisponsor=fed (last visited Nov. 15, 2008).
30. SCHUMER & MALONEY, supra note 14, at 3.
31. Extracting equity from a home can be accomplished either with a home-equity loan or a
cash-out refinance. In a home equity loan, the homeowner borrows against the equity in their
home. See Vikas Bajaj, Equity Loans As Next Round in Credit Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27,
2008, at C2. In a cash-out refinance, the homeowner refinances for a mortgage larger than the
balance due on the home, with the excess "cashed-out" to the homeowner. See FHA.com, FHA
Refinance and Cash Out Options for Homeowners, http://www.flia.com/
refinance.cfm (last visited Nov. 15, 2008).
32. See Margaret M. McConnell et al., After the Refinancing Boom: Will Consumers Scale
Back Their Spending?, CURRENT ISSUES ECON. & FIN., Dec. 2003, at 1.
33. An adjustable rate mortgage charges a discounted rate for an initial period of time, after
which the rate adjusts to reflect a market index. See FED. RESERVE BD., CONSUMER HANDBOOK
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Although these mortgages are not predatory per se, federal agencies
have recognized the heightened risks that these products present to
subprime borrowers.34 In addition, during the same period, stated
income loans, which do not require borrowers to have their incomes
verified, became more widely available.35 As these developments
continued to expand the subprime market, the total amount of
subprime loans grew from $190 billion in 2001 to $625 billion in
2006.36 However, the proliferation of unaffordable loans would soon
bring dire consequences.
By 2007, the number of defaults on subprime loans reached a
crisis point.37 As home price appreciation slowed and interest rates
began to rise, homeowners could no longer afford to borrow against
their home's equity. Borrowers who had obtained adjustable rate
mortgages were faced with severe payment shock when the teaser
rate expired.38 As foreclosures increased, the supply of homes
increased, putting more downward pressure on home prices. 9 In
addition to the overall supply and demand problem, foreclosures
affected nearby property values in hard-hit areas.4" The decrease in
property values also limited what the lenders could recover from
foreclosing on borrowers' properties.
Eventually, the subprime mortgage industry collapsed.4' In
April 2007, the nation's second-largest subprime mortgage provider,
ON ADJUSTIBLE RATE MORTGAGES 1 (2006). For example, a 2/28 ARM charges a low, fixed
"teaser" rate for the first two years and then the interest rate adjusts periodically over the next
twenty-eight years. It is a predatory practice for loan originators to attract borrowers using the
deceptively low teaser rate while disguising significant payment increases that occur later on.
Kurt Eggert, Held up in Due Course: Predatory Lending, Securitization, and the Holder in Due
Course Doctrine, 35 CREIGHTON L. REV. 503, 516 (2002).
34. Proposed Statement on Subprime Mortgage Lending, 72 Fed. Reg. 10533-01 (Mar. 8,
2007).
35. Krinsman, supra note 27, at 4.
36. SCHUMER& MALONEY, supra note 14, at 10.
37. Krishna Guha, Greenspan Alert on U.S. House Prices, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2007, at 1.
38. Payment shock occurs when a large increase in the scheduled payments of a mortgage
surprises the borrower. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS. ET AL., INTEREST-ONLY
MORTGAGE PAYMENTS AND PAYMENT-OPTION ARMS-ARE THEY FOR YOU? 1 (2006). When
interest rates rise, the payments on an ARM rise accordingly. Id. at 12.
39. SCHUMER & MALONEY, supra note 14, at 6.
40. Dan Immergluck & Geoff Smith, The External Costs of Foreclosure: The Impact of
Single-Family Mortgage Foreclosures on Property Values, 17 HOUSING POL'Y DEBATE 57, 57
(2006).
41. Bob Tedeschi, Ripples from the Supbrime Storm, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 2007, § II (Real
Estate Desk) at 13.
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New Century Financial, filed for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy protection.42
The nation's largest mortgage lender, Countrywide Financial
Corporation, saw its stock price fall dramatically.43 From January 3,
2007 to February 4, 2008, Countrywide's share price dropped from
$42.11 to $7.22. 44
Although the fallout from the collapse is not finalized, one
anticipated result is that investors will demand a higher rate of return
for investing in the subprime mortgage market, due to their new
perception of risk.45 Consequently, future subprime borrowers will
face higher interest costs, increasing the price of home ownership.
C. Why is Predatory Lending Particularly Prevalent in the
Subprime Mortgage Industry?
Predatory lending has contributed strongly to the subprime
market crisis. It has led many families to lose their homes to
foreclosures, and it will prevent future homebuyers from accessing
credit at a reasonable price. Neither lenders nor borrowers will
benefit if predatory lending practices are allowed to continue.
The characteristics of the typical subprime borrower place him
or her in a weak bargaining position for at least three reasons. First,
subprime borrowers usually have experienced previous difficulties in
obtaining credit, leading them to underestimate their ability to obtain
new sources of credit.46 Second, subprime borrowers tend to reside
in low-income and minority communities, which are comparatively
underserved by traditional prime lenders such as national banks.47
The lack of sufficient competition among lenders limits borrowers'
42. Jonathan Stempel, New Century Files for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, REUTERS NEWS, Apr.
2, 2007.
43. Gretchen Morgenson, Inside the Countrywide Lending Spree, N. Y. TIMES, Aug. 26,
2007, § 3 (Financial Desk) at 1.
44. MSN Money, http://money.msn.com/ (type in "CFC", then select dates and push the "get
prices" button).
45. Sheila C. Bair, Chairman, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Turmoil in the U.S. Credit Markets:
Examining Recent Regulatory Responses to the Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban
Affairs (Oct. 23, 2008) (transcript available at http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/speeches/
chairman/spoct2308.html).
46. U.S. DEP'T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV. & U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, CURBING
PREDATORY HOME MORTGAGE LENDING 18 (2000), available at http://www.huduser.org/
Publications/pdf/treasrpt.pdf [hereinafter HUD-TREASURY REPORT].
47. For an explanation of why banks have fled inner-city neighborhoods, see Gregory
Squires, Forgoing a Tradition of Redlining for a Future of Reinvestment, 15 BUS. J. SERV.
GREATER MILWAUKEE 50 (1998).
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ability to bargain and shop for more favorable loan terms. 48 Third,
the subprime mortgage companies who dominate mortgage lending
in low-income and minority neighborhoods are not subject to the
same oversight as their prime market counterparts, such as federally
supervised banks. 49  These three factors help make the subprime
mortgage market particularly susceptible to predatory lending
practices.
D. Why is the Subprime Mortgage Crisis Particularly
Problematic in California?
Due to various economic and demographic factors, predatory
lending is particularly troubling in California's subprime mortgage
market. From an economic standpoint, the impending foreclosure
rate increases will be felt most acutely in states with previously
strong housing appreciation, such as California." California is
expected to have the greatest number of foreclosures among all
states. 1 Of the fifteen metropolitan areas in the country with the
highest projected foreclosure rates, nine are in located in California. 2
From a demographic perspective, significant concentrations of
African Americans and Latinos in California make the state
particularly susceptible to predatory lending practices. Research has
shown that African Americans and Latinos are more likely to
become subprime borrowers than Caucasians or Asian Americans."
One major reason is that African Americans and Latinos are more
likely to be rejected in their applications for prime loans.54
According to U.S. Census Bureau figures released in 2005,
California had the fifth largest African American population in the
country.5 In addition, in 2006, 35.9 percent of Californians were
persons of Hispanic or Latino descent, compared to a national
48. HUD-TREASURY REPORT, supra note 46, at 18.
49. Id.
50. SCHLOEMER ET AL., supra note 13, at 17.
51. SCHUMER & MALONEY, supra note 14, at 12.
52. SCHLOEMER ET AL., supra note 13, at 20.
53. ALLEN J. FISHBEIN & PATRICK WOODALL, SUBPRIME LOCATIONS: PATTERNS OF
GEOGRAPHIC DISPARITY IN SUBPRIME LENDING 4 (2006).
54. Id. at 9.
55. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATE RANKINGS: STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 24 (2005), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/
2004pubs/04statab/pop.pdf.
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average of 14.8 percent. 6 These demographic factors indicate a
particular need for California to protect its citizens from abusive
practices.
E. How Has California Attempted to
Address the Crisis?
In 2001, the California legislature enacted a set of statutes,
collectively referred to as "Division 1.6," to combat predatory
lending practices that typically occur in the subprime home mortgage
market. 7 The statutes are applicable to state-chartered financial
institutions and state-licensed brokers. 8 They are codified in the
California Financial Code under sections 4970-4979.8.' 9
In an effort to further strengthen regulations in this area,
California State Senator Michael Machado introduced Senate Bill
385 in February 2007.6" The bill officially became law on October 5,
2007.61
Although California has made a clear legislative effort to
address predatory lending in the subprime market, there are
significant flaws in the provisions of Division 1.6 and Senate Bill
385. The next two sections analyze why these statutes fail to prevent
predatory lending in the subprime mortgage market.
III. WHY CALIFORNIA FINANCIAL CODE DIVISION 1.6 HAS FAILED TO
PREVENT PREDATORY LENDING PRACTICES
A. Overview of Division 1.6
Division 1.6 applies to all loans secured by real property. 62 The
two most significant provisions in Division 1.6 are section 4970 and
section 4973. Section 4970 contains definitions for terms used
throughout Division 1.6,63 while section 4973 lists prohibited acts
56. U.S. Census Bureau, U.S., California QuickFacts, http://quickfacts.census.gov/
qfd/states/06000.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2008).
57. Am. Fin. Servs. Ass'n v. City of Oakland, 104 P.3d 815, 815 (Cal. 2005).
58. In California, most individual mortgage brokers are licensed through the Department of
Real Estate, while mortgage companies obtain corporate licenses from the Department of
Corporations. See CAL. FIN. CODE § 4970(g) (Deering 2007).
59. Id. §§ 4970-4979.8.
60. S.B. 385, S. 2007-2008 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2007).
61. Id.
62. CAL. FIN. CODE §§ 4970-4979.8 (Deering 2007)
63. Id. § 4970.
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and limitations for loans that qualify as a "covered loan" under
section 4970.' In short, Division 1.6 only offers protection to a
subprime borrower if the subprime loan she acquired fits under the
section 4970 definition of a "covered loan. '"65
In order to qualify as a covered loan, the loan must first meet
certain distinct criteria. First, the loan must be a consumer loan in
which the original principal balance of the loan does not exceed
$417,000.66 Second, if the loan is a mortgage, it must meet at least
one of two conditions: (A) The annual percentage rate67 at
consummation of the transaction is more than eight percentage points
greater than the yield on Treasury securities having a comparable
period of maturity;68 or (B) the total points69 and fees payable by the
consumer at or before closing of the mortgage will exceed 6 percent
of the total loan amount.7 ° If neither condition is met, the loan is not
subject to the protections of Division 1.6.
To appreciate the conditions set out above, imagine a
hypothetical subprime borrower named Bob. Suppose Bob obtains a
thirty-year subprime mortgage worth $200,000. The mortgage has
satisfied the first condition of a covered loan, because it is a
consumer loan 7' and because the loan is less than $417,000. Now,
suppose the yield on a thirty-year Treasury bond is 4.5 percent.72 In
order to satisfy the second condition of a covered loan, one of two
facts must be true. Either the mortgage must have an annual
percentage rate greater than 12.5 percent, since this is eight
percentage points higher than the Treasury bond yield, or the
64. Id. § 4973.
65. Id. § 4970.
66. Id. § 4970(b).
67. The annual percentage rate ("APR") is the total cost of credit for one year, expressed as a
percentage of the loan's total remaining unpaid balance at the beginning of a given year. Federal
Reserve Bank of New York, Interest Rates: An Introduction, http://www.ny.frb.org/education/
define.html#aps (last visited October 31, 2008).
68. CAL. FIN. CODE § 4970(b) (1) (Deering 2007).
69. Points are a one-time fee the borrower pays to lower the interest rate. See id. § 4970(c).
70. Id. § 4970(b)(2).
71. A consumer loan is defined as a "consumer credit transaction that is secured by real
property located in" California, and "intended to be" the consumer's principal dwelling. Id. §
4970(d).
72. For historical data regarding Treasury bond rates, see U.S. Department of Treasury,
Interest Rate Statistics, http://www.treas.gov/offices/domestic-finance/debt-management/interest-
rate/yieldjhistorical main.shtml.
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mortgage must have points and fees exceeding 6 percent of
$200,000, or $12,000. Evidently, a loan must be fairly expensive in
order to qualify for the protections of Division 1.6.
If a loan does qualify as a covered loan, it is subject to a list of
limitations set out in section 4973. There are several notable
limitations. First, section 4973(l)(2) states that a person who
originates a loan "shall not steer, counsel, or direct any prospective
consumer to accept a loan product at a higher cost than that for
which the consumer could qualify. 73  Second, under section
4973(f)(1), the loan originator must reasonably believe that the
borrower will be able to make the scheduled repayments.
7 4
Specifically, the statute presumes the consumer will be able to make
the scheduled payments if, when the loan is consummated, the
borrower's monthly debts do not exceed 55 percent of his or her
monthly gross income.75 Third, section 4973(c) restricts the use of
negative amortization, 76 except in the case of first mortgages. 77 As
discussed below, each of the above prohibitions contains flaws that
prevent them from reducing predatory lending.
B. Problem I. Yield Spread Premiums
A yield spread premium ("YSP") is a cash bonus that the
mortgage broker receives from the lender for placing the borrower in
a loan with a higher interest rate than the minimum accepted by the
lender.7 ' Because of YSPs, brokers have a strong incentive to steer
borrowers to higher-interest loans, even though they could have
qualified for cheaper loans. 79  A borrower may be completely
unaware that she qualifies for a better interest rate. As stated above,
California Financial Code section 4973(l)(2) specifically prohibits a
73. CAL. FIN. CODE § 4973(l)(2) (Deering 2007).
74. Id. § 4973(0(1).
75. Id.
76. Negative amortization occurs when the outstanding principal on a loan increases because
the monthly payment(s) do not cover the monthly interest. John C. Dugan, Comptroller of the
Currency, Remarks Before the Consumer Federation of America 1 (December 1, 2005) (transcript
available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/release/2005-117a.pdf).
77. CAL. FIN. CODE § 4973(c) (Deering 2007).
78. CENTER FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, YIELD SPREAD PREMIUMS: A POWERFUL
INCENTIVE FOR EQUITY THEFT, CRL ISSUE BRIEF No. 11, at 1 [hereinafter RESPONSIBLE
LENDING].
79. Id.
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loan originator from steering a prospective customer to a loan with a
higher cost if the customer could qualify for a cheaper loan.8" But
because this prohibition applies only to "covered loans" under
section 4970, it fails to address the abusive use of YSPs.
In Wolski v. Fremont Investment and Loan,8' the California
Court of Appeal held that a YSP cannot be construed as a fee
payable "at or before closing."82 Therefore, YSPs are not considered
to be "points and fees" under section 4970 because this statute
regulates only points and fees payable "at or before closing."83 In
short, even if a loan originator receives an unnecessary YSP, the
borrower is not protected by section 4973 if the points and fees on
her loan are less than 6 percent and the APR is not more than 8
percent greater than the interest on a similar-maturity Treasury bond.
Referring back to hypothetical borrower Bob,84 suppose Bob is
unaware that he can qualify for a loan with an interest rate as low as
8.5 percent. If the loan originator places Bob into a loan with a 10.5
percent interest rate, the loan originator will receive a YSP bonus
from the lender because the lender will receive an extra 2 percent of
interest over the life of Bob's loan. Bob's loan will not be regulated
by section 4973(l)(2) as long as the APR on his loan is not 8 percent
higher than the Treasury bond rate. So, the loan originator can
legally steer Bob into a higher-priced loan even though this is
precisely the predatory practice section 4973(l)(2) sought to prevent.
There are two significant consumer protection problems when
YSPs are used in the subprime mortgage market. First, when a loan
originator charges a YSP, equity is stolen from the borrower. Since
the borrower was entitled to a lower interest rate, when she takes a
higher-priced loan offered by the loan originator she will ultimately
pay more interest over the life of the loan than is necessary.85 This
scenario is particularly problematic when the loan originator targets
unsophisticated borrowers who do not understand their options.86
80. See supra Part M.A.
81. 25 Cal. Rptr. 3d 500 (Ct. App. 2005).
82. Id. at 503.
83. CAL. FIN. CODE § 4970(b)(2) (Deering 2007).
84. See supra Part III.A.
85. See KEITH ERNST ET AL., STEERED WRONG: BROKERS, BORROWERS, AND SUBPRIME
LOANS 5 (2008), available at http://www.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/steered-wrong-brokers-
borrowers-and-subprime-loans.pdf [hereinafter ERNST, STEERED WRONG.
86. See id. at 7.
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Second, YSPs motivate the lender to charge a prepayment penalty.
In most cases, lenders pay the YSP bonus to the broker at the start of
the loan. 7 They are willing to do so only because they will recover
the cost of the bonus from the additional interest payments the
borrower pays over the life of the loan.8 If the borrower were to pay
off the loan early, however, the lender would not recover the cost of
the YSP bonus it paid to the broker.8 9 Thus, YSPs give the lender
incentive to impose a prepayment penalty to guarantee that the lender
will recover the YSP bonus if the borrower repays the loan early.9"
There are two reasons why prepayment penalties should be
discouraged. First, despite popular perception to the contrary,
studies have shown that prepayment penalties do not confer interest
rate benefits to borrowers.9 Second, prepayment penalties steal
home equity from a borrower, just like YSPs. When a subprime
borrower improves his credit and attempts to refinance to obtain a
less-costly loan, the prepayment penalty is generally financed into
the new loan, functioning as an additional and expensive fee.92
In summary, YSPs increase the overall price of a loan and cause
lenders to penalize borrowers for refinancing. Although the court in
Wolski realized that YSPs were "considered by some to be a
predatory lending practice,"93 it left the remedy to the legislature.
Those in favor of YSPs point out that the use of YSPs allows
borrowers with liquidity constraints to shift the closing costs of the
loan into their interest payments.94 However, a recent article in the
Stanford Journal of Law, Business & Finance concluded that it is
87. Id. at 8.
88. RESPONSIBLE LENDING, supra note 78, at 2.
89. See ERNST, STEERED WRONG, supra note 85, at 5.
90. RESPONSIBLE LENDING, supra note 78, at 2.
91. See KEITH S. ERNST, BORROWERS GAIN NO INTEREST RATE BENEFITS FROM
PREPAYMENT PENALTIES ON SUBPRIME MORTGAGES 1 (2005).
92. ACORN.org, Predatory Lending Practices, http://acom.org/index.php?id=754 (last
visited Nov. 15, 2008).
93. 25 Cal. Rptr. 3d 500, 508 (Ct. App. 2005).
94. This is called a "no closing cost" loan. In a no-closing-cost loan, the broker inflates the
interest rate and uses funds from the YSP to cover the closing fees. See ZeroMillion.com, Home
Mortgages: Does a No Closing-cost Loan Make Sense for You?, http://www.zeromillion.com/
financial-services/home-mortgages-does-a-no-closing-cost-loan-make-sense-for-you-by-douglas-
hanna.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2008). The borrower would then make up for the closing fees
by paying more interest over the life of the loan. Id. While the concept is sound, equity theft
occurs if a broker charges a higher-than-necessary interest rate but pockets the excess funds.
RESPONSIBLE LENDING, supra note 78, at 1.
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doubtful brokers use YSPs to aid borrowers with liquidity
constraints. 95 Rather, loan originators have used YSPs as a common
and substantial source of additional compensation. 96 Research has
shown that borrowers receive less than thirty-five cents of value for
every dollar paid in YSPs.9" Altogether, YSPs have been used to
increase compensation for brokers at the expense of consumers
without substantial justification, and Division 1.6 fails to address this
practice.
C. Problem II." Loose Underwriting Standards
California Financial Code section 4973(f)(1) was meant to
address the responsibilities of the loan originator in assessing the
ability of the borrower to repay the loan obligation.98 In order to
avoid liability, a loan originator must "reasonably believe" that the
consumer will be able to repay the loan.99 In the first clause of the
second paragraph, the statute adds:
The consumer shall be presumed to be able to make the
scheduled payments to repay the obligation if, at the time
the loan is consummated, the consumer's total monthly
debts, including amounts owed under the loan, do not
exceed 55 percent of the consumer's monthly gross
income. '00
Under this rule, a loan originator conclusively meets the "reasonable
belief' requirement if the borrower's debt-to-income ratio is less
than 55 percent.'
The presumption that a borrower can repay her loan if her debt-
to-income ratio is less than 55 percent is economically irrational.
First, section 4973(f)(1) uses gross income to calculate the debt-to-
95. Howell E. Jackson & Laurie Burlingame, Kickbacks or Compensation: The Case of
Yield Spread Premiums, 12 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 289 (2007).
96. Id. at 353.
97. Id. at 295.
98. CAL. FN. CODE § 4973(0(1) (Deering 2007).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. The debt-to-income ratio calculated according to section 4973 is known as the back end
ratio. See Homes & Communities: U.S. Department of Housing & Urban Development,
Glossary, http://www.hud.gov/offices/hsg/sfh/buying/glossary.cfm (last visited Nov. 15, 2008).
This involves summing up all of the borrower's monthly debts, including non-housing debt, and
dividing it by gross monthly income. Id. This is different from the front end debt-to-income
ratio, which divides only the mortgage payment by the gross monthly income. Id.
Winter 2009] PREVENTING PREDATORY LENDING
income ratio. To understand why this can be problematic, imagine
the following scenario: Subprime borrower Jane, who is the head of
her household and makes $3,000 per month, holds $1,500 of monthly
debt, including the cost of the subprime loan. In this case, her debt-
to-income ratio is 50 percent ($1,500 - $3,000 = 0.5). Under section
4973(f)(1), the loan originator can legally presume that Jane will be
able to make her loan payments.
But, the $3,000 per month that Jane makes does not include tax
deductions. Under 2007 California and federal tax rates, Jane still
owes the government an additional $513.03 per month in income
tax.'12 Thus, after paying off her debts and taxes, Jane is actually left
with only about one-third of her income for the living expenses of
her household.' 3 Considering that in the 2005 U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics consumer expenditure survey, the average American
consumer spent about 24 percent of his pre-tax income on food and
transportation alone,'14 Jane will have a very difficult time paying all
of her monthly bills.
The second problem with the 55 percent debt-to-income ratio
threshold is that it does not reflect proven industry practices. The
Federal Housing Administration, which was established in 1934,
offers government-backed housing loans to help reduce the costs of
mortgages.0 5 In order to prevent homebuyers from agreeing to loans
that they cannot afford, the agency sets a debt-to-income ratio
threshold to qualify borrowers.0 6 According to the 2007 Federal
Housing Agency guidelines, the maximum debt-to-income ratio
under which a borrower can qualify for a loan is 41 percent.0 7
Because the agency already allows a higher ratio threshold than the
threshold on most traditional loans, 8 it makes little sense for
California to set the ratio threshold at 55 percent. California's
102. See infra Appendix A for tax calculations.
103. ($3,000 of income) - ($1,500 of debt) - ($513.03 of taxes) = $986.97, approximately 1/3
of $3000.
104. See U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, CONSUMER EXPENDITURES IN 2005, at 3
(2007), available at http://www.bls.gov/cex/csxann05.pdf.
105. See Lee Ann Obringer, How Mortgages Work, How STUFF WORKS, Oct. 8, 2002,
http://money.howstuffworks.com/mortgage4.htm.
106. See FHA.com, FHA Loan Debt to Income Ratios: Facts and Guidelines,
http://www.fha.com/debt to-incomeratios.cfn (last visited Oct. 31, 2008) [hereinafter FHA
Loan Debt to Income Ratios].
107. Id.
108. Obringer, supra note 105.
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threshold permits a loan originator to legally presume that a loan is
affordable, even where the debt-to-income ratio is fourteen
percentage points higher than the already-high Federal Housing
Agency threshold.'09
Moreover, the Federal Housing Administration's ratio
guidelines are applicable to all levels of loans, including prime loans.
Because subprime loans carry more risks than prime loans, subprime
borrowers should be qualified using a lower debt-to-income ratio
than prime borrowers. A recent study analyzing about half of all
subprime mortgages in the United States found that the average debt-
to-income ratio of subprime loans originated between 2001 and 2006
hovered between 38 to 41.1 percent."0 Since an alarming percentage
of these loans have gone or will go into default,"' even a 40 percent
debt-to-income ratio represents significant risk. By continuing to use
an outlandish 55 percent debt-to-income ratio threshold, the
California legislature has ignored the warning signs from the
subprime mortgage market.
A third problem with using the debt-to-income ratio to
determine a borrower's ability to repay is that this ratio does not take
into account variations in annual income. For example, under
California Financial Code section 4973(f)(1), the debt-to-income
ratio may be calculated using "the credit application, the consumer's
financial statement, a credit report, financial information provided to
the person originating the loan . . . or any other reasonable
means.""2 Thus, there is no requirement that the broker consider the
earnings history of the borrower.
For borrowers whose income fluctuates based on factors such as
overtime, bonuses, or seasonal earnings, a debt-to-income ratio
calculated using only recent income might not accurately reflect the
borrower's long-term ability to repay a loan. Altogether, California
has made it too easy for loan originators to meet the "reasonable
belief' requirement under section 4973(f)(1). By taking advantage
of the presumption in favor of loans that feature a debt-to-income
ratio at or below 55 percent, an unscrupulous broker may, without
fear of legal consequence, offer a loan to a borrower with the
109. Id.; FHA Loan Debt to Income Ratios, supra note 106.
110. Demyanyk & Hemert, supra note 10, at 6-7.
111. See supra notes 36-45 and accompanying text regarding anticipated foreclosures.
112. CAL. FIN. CODE § 4973(0(1) (Deering 2007) (emphasis added).
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expectation that the borrower will default. Upon default, the lending
institution would recover the property.113 The federal government
has identified this type of asset-based lending, where a loan is made
based on the equity of a property rather than on the borrower's
ability to repay, as a predatory practice in the subprime mortgage
market."4 Yet by providing the 55 percent presumption," 5 Division
1.6 permits this predatory practice.
D. Problem III: Negative Amortization
Negative amortization occurs when a consumer's required
minimum payment on a loan is less than the full amount of interest
and fees due each month."6 As a result, when the consumer makes
only the minimum payment, the underlying principal owed
increases."'7
Negative amortization is dangerous to borrowers for two
reasons. First, negative amortization prevents the borrower from
building home equity." 8 As the principal grows during the negative
amortization period, the amount of interest due also increases." 9
Therefore, the borrower can become trapped in a cycle of making
payments primarily or entirely towards interest, while not reducing
the principal owed. Like the use of YSPs, 20 the use of negative
amortization increases the overall price of the loan.'2'
The second danger of negative amortization is that it increases
the likelihood of payment shock.'22 Payment shock occurs when a
borrower faces a significant and sudden increase in his monthly
113. See Obringer, supra note 105 ("[T]he mortgagee holds a lien on your property and can
foreclose said lien and sell your property in the event you default on your mortgage.").
114. See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY ET AL., EXPANDED GUIDANCE
FOR SUBPRIME LENDING PROGRAMS 10 (2001), available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/
release/2006-107a(Guidance).pdf.
115. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
116. See Dugan, supra note 76, at 1.
117. Id. at 7.
118. See id. (it is difficult to build equity because "if the borrower makes another minimum
payment [which] does not cover the increased amount of interest, the unpaid deficit-which has
also increased-is again added to the loan balance") (alteration in original).
119. Id.
120. See supra Part II.B.
121. See Dugan, supra note 76, at 7.
122. See id. at 10.
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housing debt.2 3 Research has indicated that a small increase in the
size of payment shock creates a drastic increase to the probability of
default. 124  The seductive prospect of low minimum payments is
especially attractive to subprime borrowers, who cannot afford
higher monthly payments.'25 But because any unpaid interest accrues
over time, monthly payments must necessarily increase at some
future date.2 6  When this occurs, the borrower is likely to suffer
payment shock, and if she is unable to meet the new payment
minimums, she can lose her home to foreclosure.
27
California Financial Code section 4973(c) attempts to restrict the
use of negative amortization.'28 In particular, a covered loan cannot
contain a provision for negative amortization "such that the payment
schedule for monthly payments causes the principal balance to
increase." 29 Based on this restriction, it appears that the legislature
was aware of the dangers of negative amortization. Yet the
protection against negative amortization is incomplete because the
next provision in section 4973(c) creates an exception allowing the
lender to apply negative amortization to first mortgages. 130  This
exception encourages unscrupulous brokers to market loans with
negative amortization to new homebuyers as affordable products.
Subprime borrowers, who characteristically fail to realize the
economic consequences of their behavior, are likely to be enticed by
the temporary benefits of these loans.'
123. Id.
124. See Anthony Pennington-Cross, The Value of Foreclosed Property, 28 J. REAL- EST. RES.
193, 208 (2006) (noting that "once in negative equity, there is little incentive to maintain the
property" or "behave responsibly with respect to other obligations," such as making monthly
payments).
125. See Dugan, supra note 76, at 10.
126. Id.
127. See e.g., Pennington-Cross, supra note 124, at 197-98 ("While other events, typically
referred to as trigger events (such as employment and family structure shocks), can lead to missed
payments it makes sense for borrowers to default, instead of prepaying the loan ....
128. CAL. FIN. CODE § 4973(c) (Deering 2007).
129. Id.
130. Cal. Fin. Code section 4973(c) prohibits negative amortization "unless the covered loan
is a first mortgage and the person who originates the loan discloses to the consumer that the loan
contains a negative amortization provision." Id.
131. See generally SENDHIL MULLAINATHAN, PSYCHOLOGY AND DEVELOPMENT
ECONOMICS (2004) (applying existing research on economic decision-making psychology to
development economics).
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Why did the California legislature provide this exception? The
reason is that federal law preempts California from regulating
negative amortization on first mortgages. Congress enacted the
Alternative Mortgage Transaction Parity Act (AMPTA)32 in 1982 to
extend federal mortgage regulations to state housing creditors.
AMTPA prohibits states from regulating "alternative mortgage
transactions" ("AMTs").'33 The Fifth Circuit has stated that AMTs
include "all manner of mortgage instruments that do not conform to
the traditional fully-amortized, fixed-interest-rate mortgage loan."''
As such, subprime mortgages are covered under the definition of
AMTs. Specifically, the First Circuit has noted that examples of
AMTs include mortgages that "may permit negative amortization."'35
Under these definitions of AMTs, California cannot regulate the
practice of negative amortization in a first subprime mortgage.
However, the mortgage industry has changed dramatically since
Congress first enacted the AMTPA. In the early 1980s, the country
suffered through a severe recession, and high interest rates
prevailed.'36 In that environment, Congress recognized that AMTs
were essential to ensure an adequate supply of credit secured by
residential property."' It also recognized that federally chartered
depository institutions had been authorized to engage in AMTs,
while state creditors had not.'38  In order to prevent the
discriminatory impact of federal regulations on state housing
creditors, Congress passed AMTPA to give state creditors the power
to bypass state regulations on AMTs.'39
Today, the value of AMTPA is questionable. Until recently,
low interest rates and a booming national subprime mortgage market
produced an abundance of available credit secured by residential
property. There is, however, an indisputable need for better
132. 12 U.S.C. §§ 3801-3806 (2006).
133. Id. § 3803(c).
134. First Gibraltar Bank v. Morales, 19 F.3d 1032, 1037 (5th Cir. 1994).
135. Grunbeck v. Dime Sav. Bank of N.Y., 74 F.3d 331, 342 (lst Cir. 1996).
136. Steven Rattner, Federal Reserve Sees Little Growth in '81 with Continued High Rates,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 1981, atAl.
137. See 12 U.S.C. § 380 1(a)(2) (2006).
138. Id. § 3801(a)(3).
139. Id. § 3801(b).
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regulation of AMTs. Congress should modify the AMTPA and
return regulatory power to the states.
In an attempt to reduce the impact of negative amortization,
California Financial Code section §4973(c) requires any person who
originates a loan with a negative amortization provision to disclose to
the consumer that the provision may add principal to the balance of
the loan. 4  This provision is supposed to mitigate the risk of
payment shock. However, scholars have continued to question the
effectiveness of increased disclosure in helping borrowers.141
Specifically, more disclosure can cause information overload,
discouraging the borrower from attempting to understand the details
of the loan. 42 Moreover, even if the borrower desires to understand
the terms, subprime loans are most prevalent in low-income
neighborhoods, where borrowers are less likely than their higher-
income counterparts to have any financial education. 43  Overall, it
cannot be said that disclosure alone offers sufficient protection for
borrowers against the risks of negative amortization. Unfortunately,
unless Congress amends or removes AMTPA, California is
powerless to regulate negative amortization.
E. Summary of Problems in Division 1.6
In sum, Division 1.6 contains three critical problems that
prevent it from being an effective deterrent to predatory lending in
the California subprime mortgage market. Division 1.6 fails to
regulate yield spread premiums, provides loose underwriting
standards, and allows negative amortization on first mortgages. As
the next section discusses, recent California legislation should also
prove ineffective to cure these problems.
140. CAL. FIN. CODE § 4973(c) (Deering 2007).
141. See generally Lauren E. Willis, Decision Making and the Limits of Disclosure: The
Problem of Predatory Lending: Price, 65 MD. L. REv. 707 (2006) (discussing the problem of
predatory home lending and describing how disclosure can be used in legal regulation of home
lending).
142. Id. at 767.
143. Steven G. Anderson, Min Zhan & Jeff Scott, Targeting Financial Management Training
at Low-Income Audiences: Bits, Briefs, and Applications, 38 J. CONSUMER AFF. 167 (2004).
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IV. WHY 2007 CALIFORNIA SENATE BILL 385 WILL FAIL TO
PREVENT PREDATORY LENDING PRACTICES
A. Overview of Senate Bill 385
California Senate Bill 385, chaptered on October 5, 2007,14
represents California's latest effort in addressing the problem of
predatory lending in the California subprime mortgage market.
Similar to Division 1.6, this bill regulates state-chartered financial
institutions and state-licensed lenders and brokers.'45 Essentially, the
bill requires the commissioners of the Departments of Real Estate,
Corporations, and Financial Institutions to apply two federal
guidance documents to regulate state-based lending entities.
Namely, they will apply the Interagency Guidance on Non-
traditional Mortgage Product Risks'46 ("2006 Interagency Guidance")
and a Statement on Subprime Mortgage Lending "' ("2007 Subprime
Statement"). Both documents were drafted by the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency, the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the
Office of Thrift Supervision, and the National Credit Union
Administration. Any analysis of Senate Bill 385 necessitates an
examination of these two federal documents. The following two
sections will identify issues with applying these federal documents in
California.
B. Issues in Applying the 2006 Interagency Guidance
The 2006 Interagency Guidance provides suggestions on a
variety of home mortgage issues, including loan terms and
underwriting standards, portfolio and risk management, and
consumer protection.4 ' Unfortunately, on the whole, the guidance
144. A bill is "chaptered" by the Secretary of State after it has passed through both houses of
the legislature and has been signed by the Governor or becomes law without the Governor's
signature. See Ken Hurdle, California Senate Office of Research, The California Legislative
Process (May 1996), http://www.csun.edu/codtraining/atacp/supplements/fphl .html#link3.
145. CAL. FIN. CODE § 4970(g) (Deering 2007).
146. Interagency Guidance on Nontraditional Mortgage Product Risks, 71 Fed. Reg. 58,609
(Oct. 4, 2006).
147. Proposed Statement on Subprime Mortgage Lending, 72 Fed. Reg. 10,533 (Mar. 8,
2007).
148. Interagency Guidance on Nontraditional Mortgage Product Risks, 71 Fed. Reg. at
58,613-17.
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document lacks the level of specificity needed to create practical
benefits.
In its recommended practices, 49 the 2006 Interagency Guidance
places a strong emphasis on increasing communication with
customers and on providing full disclosure through promotional
materials and product descriptions. Yet it is questionable whether
these measures actually benefit subprime borrowers. As research has
suggested, mandated disclosure does not necessarily allow a
customer to make better decisions. 5 ° To the contrary, research
suggests that predatory lenders tend to use the disclosure
requirements to their advantage by bombarding the customer with
information, in hopes that the borrower will not have the time or
willpower to read all of the documents. 5'
The 2006 Interagency Guidance provides a vague instruction
regarding disclosure, stating that institutions "should provide
consumers with information that is designed to help them make
informed decisions.' 52 Instead of specifying what information is or
is not relevant, the 2006 Interagency Guidance leaves discretion in
the hands of loan originators.'53 Without specific regulations,
unethical loan originators can simply overload the customer with
unnecessary information. Doing so provides the loan process with a
"veneer of legality and authority"'54 and also gives the loan originator
a defense if litigation arises.
Subsequent to its disclosure recommendations, the 2006
Interagency Guidance provides suggestions regarding the issues of
payment shock, negative amortization, and prepayment penalties."'
Unfortunately, much like the recommended practices on disclosure,
these recommendations focus only on apprising the customers of
risks, rather than reducing such risks. There are neither numerical
guidelines nor suggestions that loan originators should prevent
negative amortization or prepayment penalties. Because California
149. Id. at 58,617-18.
150. See Willis, supra note 141, at 831.
151. Id. at 790-91.
152. Interagency Guidance on Nontraditional Mortgage Product Risks, 71 Fed. Reg. at
58,617.
153. Id.
154. Willis, supra note 141, at 794.
155. Interagency Guidance on Nontraditional Mortgage Product Risks, 71 Fed. Reg. at
58,617.
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Financial Code section 4973 already regulates the use of negative
amortization'56 and prepayment penalties, 57 the 2006 Interagency
Guidance does nothing to improve the current situation.
Another problem with the 2006 Interagency Guidance is its
failure to restrict the use of "reduced documentation" loans in the
subprime market. A reduced-documentation loan substitutes detailed
analysis of a borrower's repayment capacity with "assumptions and
unverified information."'58  The dangers of this practice are well
known, as the 2006 Interagency Guidance notes: "A number of
commentators, however, including community and consumer
organizations, financial institutions, and industry associations,
suggested that reduced-documentation loans should not be offered to
subprime borrowers."' 59 Despite this observation, however, federal
regulators "declined to provide guidance recommending reduced-
documentation loans be limited to any particular set of
circumstances. 1 6  Instead, the 2006 Interagency Guidance only
"suggests strong quality control and risk mitigation factors with
respect to these practices. ''161 Again, there is a disturbing trend of
placing discretion in the hands of loan originators.
The 2006 Interagency Guidance's failure to regulate reduced-
documentation loans in the subprime market is particularly baffling
considering the suggestions it provides regarding risk mitigation.
The document suggests that the risk-mitigating factors of borrowers
include higher credit scores, lower loan-to-value ratios,'62 lower debt-
to-income ratios, and significant liquid assets. 163 But none of these
factors are likely to be present in a typical subprime borrower."
Essentially, the 2006 Interagency Guidance sets forth the following
contradictory position: it will permit subprime borrowers to obtain
156. CAL. FIN. CODE § 4973(c) (Deering 2007).
157. Id. § 4973(a).
158. Interagency Guidance on Nontraditional Mortgage Product Risks, 71 Fed. Reg. at
58,614.
159. Id. at58,611.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. The loan-to-value ratio is the ratio of money borrowed compared to the property's fair-
market value. U.S. Department of Housing & Urban Development, supra note 101.
163. Interagency Guidance on Nontraditional Mortgage Product Risks, 71 Fed. Reg. at
58,614.
164. See supra Part lI.B.
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:529
high-risk, reduced-documentation loans, even though (1) such loans
should be issued only when there are proven mitigating factors and
(2) subprime borrowers typically do not demonstrate these factors.
Overall, the 2006 Interagency Guidance emphasizes disclosure
but fails to place any substantial procedural limits on the activities of
loan originators. Although well-designed disclosures could
potentially help borrowers make better decisions, giving loan
originators full discretion regarding what information to disclose
leads only to more, not better, disclosure. Additional disclosure can
create information overload, a facade of legality, and a shield for
lenders during litigation. Moreover, the 2006 Interagency Guidance
does not adequately address areas of particular concern in the
subprime market, such as payment shock, prepayment penalties,
negative amortization, and reduced-documentation loans. Thus,
applying the 2006 Interagency Guidance in California will do little to
reduce predatory lending practices.
C. Issues in Applying the 2007 Subprime Statement
The 2007 Subprime Statement suffers from many of the same
flaws as the 2006 Interagency Guidance. Notably, the statement
contains no discussion regarding negative amortization. In addition,
the same issues of vagueness that plague the 2006 Interagency
Guidance hamper the potential effectiveness of the 2007 Subprime
Statement.
Much like the 2006 Interagency Guidance, the 2007 Subprime
Statement grants loan originators significant discretion in the use of
reduced-documentation loans,'65 although the 2007 Subprime
Statement proposes a stricter standard for the use of such loans.'66
Unlike the 2006 Interagency Guidance, which suggests only that
lenders consider mitigating factors, the 2007 Subprime Statement
requires that reduced-documentation loans for subprime borrowers
"should be accepted only if there are mitigating factors that clearly
minimize the need for direct verification of repayment capacity.' 67
The 2007 Subprime Statement explains that mitigating factors
typically arise when a borrower with strong payment performance
165. See Proposed Statement on Subprime Mortgage Lending, 72 Fed. Reg. 10,533-36 (Mar.
8, 2007).
166. Id. at 10,535.
167. Id. (emphasis added).
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seeks to refinance an existing mortgage with a new loan of similar
size and terms. 68  While these guidelines provide more stringent
regulation over reduced-documentation loans, they nonetheless
contain two critical problems.
First, not all borrowers are given the option to document their
income. In a reduced-documentation loan, lenders charge higher
interest rates to offset the increased risk of incomplete borrower
information. However, when this risk can be mitigated using
discoverable documentation, a loan originator should not be allowed
to generate higher interest income by avoiding the documentation
process. The 2007 Subprime Statement ignores this scenario because
it does not prohibit reduced-documentation loans even when
documentation is available.
Second, although the 2007 Subprime Statement requires
mitigation factors to exist before a reduced-documentation loan can
be issued, there are no numerical guidelines on these factors. The
only procedural requirement for the loan originator is to document
her reliance on mitigating factors.'69 Because of the discretion given
to loan originators, reduced-documentation loans may be justified
using inappropriate mitigation factors.
A second significant problem with the 2007 Subprime Statement
is its failure to put significant restrictions on underwriting
practices. 7 ° In particular, the statement does not require lenders to
escrow for taxes and insurance. An escrow account adds the annual
costs of taxes and insurance to the borrower's monthly mortgage
payment. Adding these costs to monthly payments is beneficial to
borrowers for several reasons. First, it serves as a valuable
budgeting device, ensuring that taxes and insurance will be paid on
time. 171 Missed taxes or insurance could be highly damaging to a
homeowner's financial position.7 2 Second, escrow accounts ensure
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Underwriting is the process that a broker or lender goes through to determine the risk
involved in assuming a loan. FirstFidelityOnline.com, Mortgage Glossary, http://www.first
fidelityonline.com/pub/Mortgage-Glossary.
171. Edwin S. Mills, The Functioning and Regulation of Escrow Accounts, 5 HOUSING POL'Y
DEBATE 203, 209 (1994).
172. Kentucky Homeownership Protection Center, Frequently Asked Questions,
http://www.kyhousing.org/protect (follow "FAQ's" hyperlink).
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that homeowners' payments will not vary frequently.'" If a lender
escrows for taxes and insurance, the borrower will have a far better
sense of the actual monthly costs of home ownership. 17 4 When tax or
insurance costs increase, the borrower can spread the higher payment
to the escrow account over the course of twelve months, avoiding the
need to quickly accumulate additional funds.'75 Simply put, escrow
accounts provide borrowers with a better estimate of the true
monthly cost of homeownership. As such, borrowers with escrow
accounts are less likely to overextend their credit in the pursuit of a
home.
One argument against escrow accounts is that they hold the
borrower's funds over the course of the year, when the funds could
be generating interest through investments.'76 However, for low-
income, financially illiterate borrowers, it is at least debatable
whether the funds outside an escrow would ever be used to generate
investment income. Moreover, even in prime mortgage markets,
mandatory escrow accounts are routine.'77 Thus, it makes sense to
enforce escrow accounts in the subprime market, where the need for
a safety net is greater.
The 2007 Subprime Statement requires institutions to consider
the cost of taxes and insurance in calculating the borrower's debt-to-
income ratio.' Since the lender uses the debt-to-income ratio to
determine the borrower's repayment capacity, in theory there is
sufficient protection against default; therefore, escrow accounts are
not necessary. In practice, however, the debt-to-income ratio
consideration is insufficient to prevent defaults. First, the ratio is an
underwriting device used only by the lender. 79  The ratio is not
typically explained to the borrower, so the borrower is not likely to
use it to gauge whether she will be able to manage the monthly
173. Mills, supra note 171, at 209.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 210.
176. Dian Hymer, What Are the Pros and Cons of Having an Impound Account?, Feb. 2,
1997, http://www.doityourself.com/stry/impoundaccount.
177. Kenneth R. Harney, Lack of Escrow Accounts Hurts Subprime Borrowers, WASH. POST,
Mar. 31, 2007, at Fl.
178. Press Release, Dept. of the Treasury, et al., Statement on Subprime Mortgage Lending
(June 29, 2007) (on file with author).
179. See Obringer, supra note 105.
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payments. 8' Second, and more importantly, the 2007 Subprime
Statement does not provide numerical guidance on suitable debt-to-
income ratios. It is contradictory for the 2007 Subprime Statement to
require specific data, such as tax and insurance costs, to be included
in the calculation of a ratio but then make no suggestions regarding a
range of reasonable ratio values. In essence, the 2007 Subprime
Statement suggests that the loan originator is the only party
empowered to decide the affordability of the loan, and the
government will not attempt to critique the loan originator's
judgment. This notion is distressing, as placing discretion solely in
the hands of loan originators has allowed predatory lending to
flourish in California.18'
A third problem with the 2007 Subprime Statement is that it
fails to emphasize the disclosure of worst-case-scenario information.
As mentioned earlier, information overload is a major reason why
additional disclosure fails to aid in the borrower's decision-making
process.'82 Here, the statement suggests that consumers should be
informed of payment shock, prepayment penalties, balloon
payments, costs for reduced-documentation loans, and responsibility
for taxes and insurance.'83 But while such information is pertinent,
the average borrower is unlikely to understand it or realize its
consequences. Scholarly research on decision-making suggests that
people reduce most decisions to a small number of salient
characteristics.'84 Therefore, it is logical to limit disclosures, perhaps
including only the simple but critical information that the typical
borrower may understand. One example of this information is a
table illustrating the monthly payments required in the worst-case
scenario. Presumably, a borrower who accepts a loan knowing the
worst-case situation will more likely be able to afford the loan.
Although worst-case-scenario information may discourage some
borrowers from taking on subprime loans, the subprime crisis in
California has reached the point where consumer protection must
180. See id.
181. Bernanke Urges Safeguards for Housing Finance, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2008, at C3.
182. Willis, supra note 141, at 767.
183. Proposed Statement on Subprime Mortgage Lending, 72 Fed. Reg. 10533-01, 10536
(Mar. 8, 2007).
184. Willis, supra note 141, at 767.
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take priority over market growth.'85 The 2007 Subprime Statement
fails in this regard.
D. Federalism Issue in Applying Senate Bill 385
In addition to the flaws of the recommendations in the two
federal documents, there is an overarching concern with applying
federal guidance at the state level. As previously discussed,
California is economically and demographically susceptible to
abusive lending in the subprime mortgage market.'86 Therefore,
federal guidelines based on national research may not necessarily
provide a solution that resolves the California crisis. As Justice
Brandeis famously noted, it "is one of the happy incidents of the
federal system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens
choose, serve as a laboratory" and "try novel social and economic
experiments without risk to the rest of the country." '87
Unfortunately, when California adopts the guidance of national
entities, it limits the possibilities for the type of state experimentation
Brandeis encouraged. 8 Considering the sluggish response of federal
administrators to the subprime crisis,'89 the exceptionally high
foreclosure rates in California, 9 ' and the success of state legislative
reform in states with strong predatory lending laws, 9' increasing
state regulation in California is desirable. By adopting federal
guidelines, however, California Senate Bill 385 leaves the solution of
the state predatory lending problem in the hands of federal entities.
V. PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION TO PREVENT
PREDATORY LENDING
In order to address the subprime lending crisis in California, I
propose a six-part legislative solution. Although the solution does
185. See supra Part lI.D.
186. See supra Part I.E.
187. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
188. For more discussion on federal preemption in this area, see Baher Azmy, Squaring the
Predatory Lending Circle, 57 FLA. L. REV. 295 (2005).
189. Press Release, Congresswoman Carolyn Maloney, Congressional Leaders Take Action
to Address Subprime Mortgage Crisis (Oct. 4, 2007), available at http://maloney.house.gov/
index.php?option=comcontent&task-view&id=1469&Itemid=61.
190. SCHLOEMER ET AL., supra note 13, at 17.
191. WEI Li & KEITH S. ERNST, THE BEST VALUE IN THE SUBPRIME MARKET: STATE
PREDATORY LENDING REFORMS 11 (2006).
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not address all facets of predatory lending in the subprime mortgage
market, it is designed to act as a strong deterrent against the most
prevalent predatory practices. The six parts of the solution follow.
A. Modify the "Reasonable Relief" Rule in California
Financial Code Section 4973
Currently, section 4973 allows loan originators to legally
presume that a borrower can repay a loan if the borrower's debt-to-
income ratio does not exceed 55 percent. As discussed above,192 this
presumption is economically irrational and provides corrupt loan
originators with an unjustified legal defense. To ensure that
borrowers receive reasonable loans, California should make three
changes to the presumption.
First, the debt-to-income ratio should be calculated using net
income, as opposed to gross income. A ratio calculated using gross
income does not accurately reflect the debt burden on the borrower,
because gross income does not account for unpaid taxes.'93 The use
of net income eliminates this problem.
Second, the ratio figure at which a borrower can presumptively
afford a loan should be reduced from 55 percent. Since there is no
"magic ratio" that assures affordability, the ratio should be
determined using industry experience. Two options exist here. The
first option is to align the debt-to-income ratio in section 4973 with
the Federal Housing Agency threshold ratio for approving loans.
This option is feasible because, as the adoption of California Senate
Bill 385 suggests, the state is interested in aligning state standards
with national standards. Following the lead of the experienced
Federal Housing Agency increases the likelihood that the ratio
chosen will be reasonable. Currently, this ratio is 41 percent. 9 4 The
second option for California is to set the threshold ratio at a figure
below the average ratio of subprime loans from recent years. Since
the subprime crisis has emerged primarily in the last half-decade and
the average debt-to-income ratio of subprime loans from 2001 to
2006 was between 38 percent and 40 percent, California should use a
ratio below these values. This standard would not mean that
192. See supra Part III.C.
193. Obringer, supra note 105.
194. See FHA Loan Debt to Income Ratios, supra note 106.
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borrowers with a ratio greater than 38-40 percent could not qualify
for a loan; it simply means that such borrowers should not be
automatically presumed to be able to repay the loan. This safeguard
is a rational response to the high number of loan defaults in recent
years.
Third, in calculating the debt-to-income ratio, the loan originator
should be required to calculate the average ratio over several past
years. Calculating the ratio using only recent income masks
fluctuations in income, which can arise from factors such as seasonal
work or an inconsistent employment history. Home ownership,
particularly when accomplished through a risky subprime loan,
should not occur without proving the borrower's economic stability.
Altogether, the three changes above would reduce the loan
originator's discretion in underwriting loans. This shift would be an
important step towards limiting the number of unjust loans in
California.
B. Restrict the Use of Yield Spread Premiums
YSPs are not inherently predatory. In fact, a YSP can be a
useful method for shifting the closing costs of the loan into the
monthly payments of the loan, thereby reducing up-front costs. This
shift can be important for borrowers who have steady income but
who do not have substantial liquid savings. Unfortunately, as stated
earlier in this Note,'95 YSPs are not typically used to benefit
borrowers. Instead, consumers receive less than thirty-five cents per
dollar paid in YSPs.'96
To counteract this trend, California should restrict YSPs to their
useful purpose. To achieve this goal, California can require each
loan originator to inform the borrower of the lowest possible interest
rate on a loan before offering the borrower the option to shift their
closing costs into monthly payments using a YSP. With this
restriction in place, borrowers can decide for themselves whether
they would benefit from a YSP. The restriction would ensure that
YSPs are used to benefit borrowers, not to increase loan originator
compensation.
195. See Jackson & Burlingame, supra note 95, at 353.
196. Id. at 295.
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C. Regulate the Use of Low or No-Documentation Loans
California Senate Bill 385 requires various state commissioners
to apply the 2006 Interagency Guidance and the 2007 Subprime
Statement to regulate state-based lending entities. 97 As analyzed
above, these federal documents fail to adequately restrict the use of
"reduced documentation" loans. 9  California should impose
additional prohibitions on these types of loans.
The first step is to ensure that borrowers are always given the
option to document their income. Where possible, California should
require brokers to make a reasonable effort to acquire documentation
from the borrower. This requirement would prevent the broker from
charging a higher interest rate when it is unnecessary to do so.
Although brokers and lenders are not paid to do the IRS's work, this
rule would also make it more difficult for borrowers to illegally hide
their income. Second, California should set a threshold debt-to-
income ratio, above which low-documentation loans must be
prohibited. This threshold figure should be lower than the threshold
debt-to-income ratio used in California Financial Code section 4973.
In section 4973, the debt-to-income ratio is used to indicate the
borrower's ability to repay and applies to all "covered loans,"
regardless of the level of documentation. When dealing specifically
with a no-documentation or low-documentation loan, there is greater
risk regarding the legitimacy of the borrower's income. Thus, a
lower threshold debt-to-income ratio should be used to account for
this risk.
D. Standardize the Disclosure Process
Although the 2006 Interagency Guidance and the 2007
Subprime Statement place an emphasis on improving disclosure,
their recommendations on disclosure are vague and difficult to
enforce. As discussed above, the federal guidance documents place
far too much discretion in the hands of the brokers and lenders
regarding disclosure.'99 As such, each borrower may receive
different information from different loan originators, leaving
borrowers more susceptible to predatory practices.
197. S.B. 385, S. 2007-2008 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2007).
198. See infra Part IV.B (discussing reduced-documentation loans).
199. See infra Part IV.B.
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To address this situation, California should adopt a standardized
disclosure form, to be used by all loan originators in the state. The
benefits of this procedure are twofold. First, a standardized form
reduces the loan originator's discretion in selecting terms to disclose
to the borrower. This scenario ensures consistency between the
information provided by different loan originators, thereby
improving each borrower's ability to comparison shop for loans.
Second, by using a standardized form, the state can control the
volume and type of information presented to borrowers, preventing
inadequate disclosure. At the same time, the state can also prevent
information overload, as the loan originator will no longer be able to
flood the borrower with irrelevant information.
In carrying out this procedure, California must provide its
citizens with free access to the standardized disclosure form. For
instance, the form should be posted for download on public
government websites. By having this form available for public
viewing, borrowers interested in obtaining a loan will have the
opportunity to understand the form at their leisure. Having the
opportunity to review the form without time constraints is important
because during loan negotiations, borrowers may be under time
pressure and truncate their decision-making process."°'
E. Require the Use of Escrow Accounts for
Borrowers with Low Credit Scores
Legislation addressing predatory lending in the subprime market
should aim to prevent payment shock. The most efficient way to
prevent payment shock is to help borrowers understand the true costs
of home ownership. In addition to principal and interest payments, a
homeowner faces substantial annual fees in taxes and insurance.20 '
To ensure that borrowers set aside sufficient funds to cover these
fees when they are due, the majority of subprime loans should
include an escrow account.
California should add an escrow account provision to Division
1.6. This provision should make escrow accounts mandatory for all
borrowers who possess a credit score below a state-established
threshold. Because a borrower's credit score indicates her level of
200. Willis, supra note 141, at 791.
201. Obringer, supra note 105.
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fiscal responsibility, °2 a low credit score provides strong indication
that the borrower needs assistance in budgeting her finances. By
requiring escrow accounts for borrowers with low credit scores, the
state can mandate such assistance.
Behavioral Economics research provides insight into the
difficulties borrowers face in planning for the future. 2 3 Generally,
people exhibit short-run impatience and long-run patience, as they
prefer immediate rewards in the present but delayed rewards in the
future.2' As an example, most people would rather receive $20 in a
year than $19 in 364 days. Yet, the same people would prefer
receiving $19 today than $20 tomorrow.0 5 This situation arises
because a one-day delay in the far-future seems minor, while the
same delay in the near-future appears unbearable.2 6 This difference
in preferences across time creates a direct conflict between a
person's plans for the future and the person's actions when the future
2071~ brarrives. In a borrower's case, the conflict lies between present
consumption and saving for tax and insurance payments. Although
borrowers with strong fiscal responsibility can manage this conflict,
borrowers with low credit scores tend to exhibit insufficient self-
control. Fortunately, institutions can help solve self-control
problems by committing people to a particular path of behavior.2 8
An escrow account would serve this purpose well.
F. Increase Transparency in the Subprime
Mortgage Industry
To prevent predatory lending practices, the legislature must
place loan originators under greater public scrutiny. Although the
subprime crisis has received national media coverage, the structure
of the mortgage industry remains unclear to the average individual.
Because of the multitude of participants in the mortgage-lending
channel, it is critical for transactions to have a reasonable level of
202. See id.
203. See generally MULLAINATHAN, supra note 131 and accompanying text.
204. Id. at 5.
205. See, e.g., George Loewenstein, Anticipation and the Valuation of Delayed Consumption,
97 ECON. J. 666 (1987).
206. See id at 679-680.
207. MULLAINATHAN, supra note 131, at 9.
208. Id.
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transparency, such that each participant can be held accountable for
its actions.
Under the current licensing scheme in California, most mortgage
brokers are licensed through the California Department of Real
Estate.2 9  However, mortgage companies with corporate licenses
may assign any employee to originate loans, without individual
licensing or accountability requirements for the employee."'
Because of the lack of uniform standards for loan originators,
borrowers may be exposed to inconsistent information and abusive
lending practices.
To ensure that loan originators are aware of and following
mortgage-lending laws, California should move towards a uniform
licensing system. Understandably, such a system will require
substantial time to establish. In the interim, the state should, at a
minimum, initiate an electronic registry of loan originators.
California should require every loan originator to register his or her
profile on this registry. These profiles must be accessible to the
public, and they should contain relevant information, such as: the
license of the loan originator, if any; the experience of the loan
originator; the organization(s) she works under; and pending legal
actions against the loan originator, if any.
One organization that has focused on the need for transparency
in the mortgage lending industry is the UpFront Mortgage Brokers
Association ("UMBA"). 211  Established in 2006, brokers in this
association, called UMBs, vow to do business in an upfront and fully
transparent manner. Specifically, UMBs make advance disclosures
to customers regarding their fees and the wholesale prices of loans
passed through from lenders .2 " Although the UMBA is a relatively
new organization, it provides an admirable model of transparency for
California to emulate. When California establishes its registry of
loan originators, brokers who have joined the UMBA should list
209. CAL. ASS'N OF MORTGAGE BROKERS, supra note 23, at 4.
210. Id.
211. UpFront Mortgage Brokers Association, http://www.upfrontmortgagebrokers.org/
index.asp (last visited Oct. 28, 2008).
212. Jack Guttentag, What Is an Upfront Mortgage Broker?, MORTGAGE PROFESSOR'S WEB
SITE, Jan. 21, 2008, http://www.mtgprofessor.com/A-UpfrontMortgageBrokers/what is-an_
upfront-mortgage-broker.htm.
213. Id.
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such membership on their profile. Moreover, the state should
incorporate transparency requirements into the licensing process.
VI. CONCLUSION
Predatory lending has contributed strongly to the Subprime
Mortgage Crisis in California. Although California Financial Code
Division 1.6 establishes a foundation for preventing predatory
lending, the requirements therein are insufficient. The recently
chaptered California Senate Bill 385 provides little improvement
because it is vague and incomplete." 4  To effectively reduce
predatory lending in subprime mortgages, I have proposed a six-part
solution. The solution includes new laws regulating underwriting
standards, yield spread premiums, standardized disclosure, reduced-
documentation loans, escrow accounts, and broker licensing and
registration. Together, these laws should deter the most prevalent
predatory lending practices in the California subprime mortgage
market.
214. See S.B. 385, S. 2007-2008 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2007).
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APPENDIX
Hypothetical Tax Calculations
The calculations below apply the 2007 California and federal tax
rates to a hypothetical subprime borrower with $36,000 of gross
annual income.
CALIFORNIA TAX:
INCOME BRACKET TAX RATE TAX
First $6,622 0.01 $ 66.22
Next $9,076 0.02 $ 181.52
Next $9,078 0.04 $ 363.12
Next $9,618 0.06 $ 577.08
Next $1,606 0.08 $ 128.48
Annual Tax: $1,316.42
Monthly Tax: $ 109.70
FEDERAL TAX FOR THE HEAD OF A HOUSEHOLD:
INCOME BRACKET TAX RATE TAX
First $11,200 0.10 $1,120.00
Next $24,800 0.15 $3,720.00
Annual Tax: $4,840.00
Monthly Tax: $ 403.33
TOTAL MONTHLY TAX $ 513.03
